中国不会放弃朝鲜China is not about to abandon Pyongyang

You can imagine the scene in the Oval Office. “Mr President,” says Kurt Campbell, US assistant secretary of state for east Asia. “I thought you should see this dispatch from Kathleen Stephens – you know, our ambassador to Seoul, Sir. She says that a guy named Chun Yung-woo, South Korea’s vice-foreign minister, was speaking to a Chinese official who said that, get this Sir, North Korea has ‘little value to China as a buffer state’.” Mr Campbell pauses to let the significance of the fourth-hand statement sink in.

你可以想象一下白宫椭圆形办公室里发生的一幕。“总统先生，”美国东亚事务助理国务卿科特•坎贝尔(Kurt Campbell)说。“我想您应该过目一下我们驻韩大使凯瑟琳•斯蒂芬斯(Kathleen Stephens)发来的这封电报。大使说，据韩国一个名叫千英宇(Chun Yung-woo)副外长称，一位中国官员在和他交谈时表示，‘就安全屏障而言，朝鲜现在对中国几乎已经没有什么价值’。”坎贝尔顿了顿，让总统充分意识到这一第四手声明的份量。

As far as intelligence goes, this is pretty thin gruel. In fact, it is the very definition of Chinese whispers. This and similar snippets from WikiLeaks are by no means sufficient to conclude, as some have done, that there has been a significant change of heart in Beijing. Suddenly, we are led to believe, China has grown weary of its tantrum-prone North Korean ally and is prepared to prise lips from teeth – Mao Zedong’s favoured metaphor for the tight relationship – even at the cost of the North’s reunification with the South.

就情报而言，这封电报的价值十分有限。实际上，它是典型的传言。与维基解密(WikiLeaks)泄露的类似只言片语一样，这压根不足以让人（像有些人所做的那样）得出结论称，北京方面的立场发生了显著变化。突然间，有人想要我们相信，中国已厌倦了动辄耍脾气的朝鲜盟友，现在准备让唇齿分离——毛泽东喜欢用“唇亡齿寒”来比喻中朝紧密关系——即使这样做的代价是朝鲜半岛统一。

Such a conclusion would be hasty indeed. Recent actions by China point to a different conclusion, although it is fair to say that attitudes to Pyongyang have hardened following its two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Yet, significantly, the WikiLeaks cables dry up in February, a month before Pyongyang is thought to have torpedoed a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, with the loss of 46 lives. If there had really been a change of heart, Beijing would surely have condemned that attack. Instead, it refused to accept the conclusions of an international inquiry fingering Pyongyang, and even rewarded Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s leader, with an invitation to China.

这样的结论实在太草率了。中国最近的行动均指向另一个结论，尽管可以公平地说，在朝鲜2006年和2009年两次核试验之后，中国对朝鲜的态度已有所转硬。但值得注意的是，维基解密公布的电报最后日期是今年2月，也就是在朝鲜据信用鱼雷击沉韩国天安舰(Cheonan)、导致46人丧生的事件发生前一个月。如果当时中国政府真的已经改变了立场，就肯定会谴责朝鲜的行为。可事实是，中国拒绝接受将此事归咎于朝鲜的国际调查结果，反而礼待朝鲜领导人金正日(Kim Jong-il)，邀请他访华。

Second, to interpret Mr Chun’s remarks as somehow representative of a broad consensus in Beijing is to misunderstand the fractured nature of China’s foreign policy. Michael Wesley, executive director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, says that, as China’s global economic and political interests grow more complex, “it is becoming impossible to talk about a grand Chinese position on anything.”

其次，认为千英宇转述的话在某种程度上代表北京方面的广泛共识，是不了解中国外交政策的派系对立本质。澳大利亚悉尼罗维国际政策学院(Lowy Institute for International Policy)的执行主任迈克尔•韦斯利(Michael Wesley)称，随着中国的全球经济和政治利益变得更加复杂，“中国方面在每件事情上都有一致立场的可能性越来越小。”

On the North Korean issue, specifically, Mr Wesley sees a split between security-focused elements of the leadership, including those close to the People’s Liberation Army, and less “hardline” foreign policy technocrats. There may also be a generational divide, he says, between those of President Hu Jintao’s age, who hold “as an article of faith that China can’t let its ally down”, and younger Chinese officials embarrassed by a North Korea that looks like a parody of pre-1978 China.

具体而言，在朝鲜问题上，韦斯利认为，在关注国家安全（包括那些与军方关系密切）的中国领导人与态度较温和的外交政策专家型官员之间存在分歧。韦斯利表示，还可能存在“代沟”：与国家主席胡锦涛同龄的人信奉“一种中国不能让盟友失望的信条”，而较年轻的官员则因朝鲜感到尴尬，因为朝鲜看上去就像1978年以前中国的拙劣复制品。

Third, if anything, China has been seeking to reduce US influence in the region. Beijing has expressed anger at what it regards as US interference, for example in the South China Sea. A Wednesday editorial in the Global Times, an official tabloid, said of Washington’s recent efforts at closer regional engagement: “Since the US declared its return to Asia, the frequency of clashes in the Korean Peninsula has accelerated. Instead of reflecting on this, South Korea became more obsessed with its military alliance with the US.” This view is difficult to square with a more relaxed attitude towards reunification.

第三，如果说中国有什么企图的话，那就是中国一直在试图降低美国在东亚地区的影响力。中国政府已经对它眼中美国的干预（例如在南海问题上）表示出愤怒。中国官方小报《环球时报》(Global Times)上周就美国最近加紧与东亚国家的接触发表社评称：“美国宣布‘重返亚洲’以来，朝鲜半岛的危机频率在加快，韩国未加思索，反而更加迷信韩美军事同盟这服药可以包治半岛的‘百病’。”这种观点很难让人相信，中国已对朝鲜半岛统一采取了比较放松的态度。

Fourth, Beijing seems to be trying to prod North Korea towards the type of economic measures that have driven its own success. John Delury, of the Asia Society, says the one consistent message from Chinese officials is that western sanctions do not work. Encouraging economic reform is consistent with a policy of trying to preserve North Korea as a going concern, rather than preparing for its collapse. Similarly, Beijing’s apparent facilitation of North Korean weapons exports to Iran, also suggested by WikiLeaks cables, hardly points to a Chinese clampdown on Pyongyang.

第四，北京方面似乎在推动朝鲜借鉴中国的成功经验，实行经济改革。美国亚洲协会(Asia Society)的鲁乐汉(John Delury)表示，中国官员在有一件事上是说法一致的：西方的制裁不管用。鼓励经济改革，符合中方试图维持朝鲜政权（而非为其垮台做准备）的政策。同样，维基解密的电报似乎还显示，中国政府显然允许朝鲜向伊朗出口武器，这也很难让人看出中国在打压朝鲜。

Fifth, Lee Myung-bak, South Korea’s president, does not seem to harbour any illusions about the likelihood of reunification. True, this year, he floated the idea of a tax to prepare South Korea’s citizens for the possibility of a united Korea. But when I asked him about this last month, he stressed that the tax was more symbolic than real and that reunification would not happen for a very long time.

第五，对于统一的可能性，韩国总统李明博(Lee Myung-bak)似乎也不抱任何幻想。没错，今年他曾提议开征一项统一税，让韩国公民为可能的统一做准备。但当我上个月问及这件事时，他强调称，这个税在更大程度上是象征性的，而非真实的，统一在相当长时期内不会发生。

Finally, as Mr Delury points out, there may be a “good deal of wishful thinking” in seeking out Chinese officials prepared to express theoretical support for reunification. If there is one thing that should be clear from reading WikiLeaks cables, it is that diplomats are prepared to say one thing to their foreign interlocutors – and quite another behind their back.

最后，正如鲁乐汉所指出的，找出一些中国官员对朝鲜半岛统一给予理论上的支持，可能有“很大程度的一厢情愿”。如果说维基解密的电报有任何明显启示的话，那就是外交官们对他们的外国同僚当面说一套，背后说另一套。

Where does this leave us? Brian Myers, an expert on North Korea at Dongseo university, says the most interesting WikiLeaks revelation is that senior North Korean officials may have been defecting. Mr Myers argues that North Korea may well be on the brink of collapse, not because of succession issues but because of the regime’s need to provide military “victories”, the only thing it has to offer its people in the absence of a functioning economy. “The regime is basically on a collision course with the outside world,” he says, arguing that it will be gone within a decade. If he is right, one precondition of reunification – regime collapse – may be closer than we think. But that is a very far cry from saying that China would welcome it.

这一切该让我们得出什么结论？韩国东西大学(Dongseo University)的朝鲜问题专家布赖恩•迈尔斯(Brian Myers)表示，维基解密揭露的最有意思的情况是，朝鲜可能不断有高级官员叛逃。迈尔斯提出，朝鲜政权很有可能处在崩溃边缘，不是因为继承问题，而是因为这个政权需要取得军事“胜利”——在经济运行失灵的情况下，这是它唯一能给人民的东西。“朝鲜政权基本上处在与外部世界碰撞的轨道上，”迈尔斯表示，他提出，该政权将在十年内垮台。如果他是对的，那么统一的先决条件之一——朝鲜政权崩溃——可能来得比我们所想象的更快。但这并不等于中国希望看到这一结果。译者/何黎