Harry Truman, Memoirs, Chapter 24

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955) Chapter 24, pp. 372-394

July 22 was Sunday, but we had decided to continue the daily conferences without interruption. During the morning, accompanied by my old friend, Colonel and Monsignor Tiernan, and my military and naval aides, I attended Protestant church service in the Colosseum Building, a former film laboratory in the Babelsberg area. This service was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Nelson. An hour later I attended a second service in the same building, a Catholic mass conducted by Colonel Tieman. I returned to the Little White House for lunch, and shortly thereafter Prime Minister Churchill called on me and we conferred for about an hour. After attending to some urgent mail for Washington, I left for Cecilienhof Palace and called to order the sixth meeting of the conference at 5 P.M.

Our discussion was resumed where it had left off the day before, with the question of Poland's western frontier and Prime Minister Churchill restating his reasons for refusing to accept Stalin's proposal to cede the eastern territory of Germany to Poland. Stalin, in turn, challenged the Prime Minister's reasoning with the same arguments he had previously advanced.

I then read a portion of the Yalta Declaration concerning Poland's western frontier and reminded them that this agreement had been reached by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill. I added that I was in complete accord with it and wished to make the point clear that Poland now had been assigned a zone of occupation in Germany without any consultation among the three powers. While I did not object to Poland being assigned a zone, I did not like the manner in I which it had been done. Our main problem here, I repeated, was that of the occupation of Germany by the four authorized powers. That, I said, was my position yesterday, that was my position today, and that would be my position tomorrow.

Stalin said that if we were not bored with the question of frontiers he would like to point out that the exact character of the Yalta decision was that we were bound to receive the opinion of the Polish government on the question of its western frontiers. As we were not m agreement with the Polish proposal, we should hear the representatives of the new Polish government. If the heads of government did not wish to hear them, then the foreign ministers should hear them.

Stalin said that he wished to remind Mr. Churchill, as well as others who had been at the Crimea conference, that the view held by the President and Mr. Churchill with regard to the western frontier and with which he did not agree was that the line should begin from the estuary of the Oder and follow the Oder to where it is joined by the Eastern Neisse. He had insisted on the line of the Western Neisse. The plan proposed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, said Stalin, left the town of Stettin on the German side, as well as Breslau and the region west of Breslau.

At this point Stalin walked around the table and showed me this line on a map.

Stalin said the question to be settled was that of the frontier and not that of a temporary line. We could settle the matter, and we could put it off, but we could not ignore it.

Churchill agreed that the matter could not be settled without the Poles, unless, of course, we accepted the Polish proposal. Stalin then turned to me and said that in regard to my observation that a fifth country was now occupying Germany, he wished to state that if anyone was to blame, it was not just the Poles~ircumstances and the Russians were to blame.

I replied that that was exactly what I had been talking about. I then agreed that the Polish representatives could come to Potsdam and be heard by the foreign ministers, who would report to us.

It was now agreed that as presiding officer I should issue an invitation to the Poles to send representatives to the foreign ministers' meeting at Potsdam in an effort to reach some kind of practical solution to the problem of boundaries which could last until the matter was finally settled at the peace conference.

Molotov now brought up the subject of trusteeships and said that the San Francisco conference had settled, in principle, a trusteeship system, and there was now the question of the disposition of specific territories, such as Italy's colonies and also, perhaps, Korea.

Molotov went on to say that he had learned from the foreign press that Italy had lost its colonies, and the question was who had received them, and where had this matter been decided? Churchill replied by referring to the heavy losses which the British had suffered and the victories which the British Army had achieved by "conquering alone all of the colonies of Italy except Tunis."

I turned to the Prime Minister and repeated, "All?"

Churchill explained that when he referred to Italian colonies he meant Libya, Cyrenaica, and Tripoli. The British had conquered these at a time when they were under heavy attacks and were without help, he said, at least during the early part. Molotov interjected that Berlin had been conquered by the Red Army.

Churchill, ignoring Molotov, continued, saying that they were not expecting any gain out of this war. British losses had been terrible, although not so heavy in human life as those of their gallant Soviet ally. They came out of the war, however, a great debtor to the world. In spite of the heavy losses they had suffered, they had made no territorial claims-no Koenigsberg-no Baltic states-nothing. With regard to the Italian colonies, he said he regarded Italy as having lost them, but this did not preclude the peace conference from considering whether some of these colonies should be restored to Italy. He was not declaring himself in favor of restoration but was willing to discuss it. At present, Churchill said, the British held these colonies. He wanted to know who wanted them. If there were claimants, said Churchill, they should put forward their claims.

I said that the United States did not want them, nor did we want a trusteeship over them.

Molotov said that the Soviet proposal had been submitted in writing and that they would like the conference to consider them. Churchill asked what did the Soviet allies want? Did Stalin wish to put forward a claim to one of these Italian colonies?

Stalin replied that they would like to learn whether this conference was going to deal with the question of whether Italy was to lose these colonies. In such an event, they could decide to what states they would be transferred for trusteeship.

Churchill said he had not considered the possibility of the Soviet Union desiring a large tract of the African shore. If that were the case, it would have to be considered in relation to many other problems.

Stalin declared that at San Francisco the Soviet delegation had stated that they were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories, and the matter was now set forth in the Russian paper.

I pointed out that the Soviet proposal was a matter for the foreign ministers to discuss and that I had no objection to this.

Churchill said he had no objection either, and it was agreed that the question of trusteeships be referred to the foreign ministers. We turned our attention to the question of Turkey.

Churchill said there was an admitted need to modify the old Montreux Convention regarding Turkey, and he had frequently expressed his readiness to welcome an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships through the Black Sea and back. But he wished to impress on Marshal Stalin the importance of not alarming Turkey. Turkey was very much alarmed, he said, by a strong concentration of Bulgarian and Soviet troops in Bulgaria, by continuous attacks in the Soviet press, and by the conversations between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov in which modifications of Turkey's eastern frontier were mentioned, as well as a Soviet base in the straits.

Molotov explained that the Turkish government had taken the initiative through the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow and had proposed an alliance with Russia. In 1921, he said, a portion of Russian territory had been torn from Soviet Armenia and Soviet Georgia, and he had insisted that this question be settled before the conclusion of a treaty of alliance.

Churchill challenged the right of the Russians to consider the matter of the Black Sea straits as one in which no one had a voice except themselves and Turkey. Molotov replied that similar treaties had existed between Russia and Turkey in the past, and he cited the treaties of 1805 and 1833.

Churchill said he would have to ask his staff to look up these ancient treaties. He said that the British were not prepared to push Turkey to accept such proposals from Russia.

I said that I was not ready to express an opinion and suggested that we defer consideration of the question until necessary study could be given to it. This was agreed to.

After an exchange between Churchill and Molotov on the question of the treatment of Russian prisoners in Italy, I adjourned the meeting. We met the following day, July 23, for the seventh meeting of the conference. The agenda for that day involved four controversial territories: Turkey, Koenigsberg, Syria and Lebanon, and Iran. Other questions which had been passed over or referred to the foreign ministers were in the drafting stage or still under study by heads of state, the secretaries, and boards of experts assembled at Potsdam. Military talks were going on between the Chiefs of Staff. The sessions of the Big Three were only a part of the continuous round of discussions and consultations which were going on at all hours in the area of the conference.

Churchill spoke first, reaffirming his position that he could not consent to the establishment of a Russian base in the straits, adding that he did not think Turkey would agree to that proposal.

Stalin declared that Churchill had been mistaken in saying that the Russians had frightened the Turks by concentrating too many troops in Bulgaria. Russia had fewer troops in Bulgaria, he said, than the British had in Greece. Churchill inquired how many Stalin thought the British had in Greece. Stalin replied, "Five divisions." Churchill said there were only two. Stalin inquired about armored units and asked how strong the British divisions were.

Churchill said they had about forty thousand troops altogether in Greece. Stalin replied that they had only about thirty thousand in Bulgaria.

Churchill said he hoped that the meeting would hear Field Marshal Alexander, as he preferred that he give the figures, to which Stalin replied that he was not seeking for accuracy and that he believed Churchill "one hundred per cent." But the Turks, with twenty-three divisions of their own, had nothing to fear from the Russians, he said. He explained that, as to the rectification of the frontier, perhaps it was the possible restoration of the prewar frontiers that had existed under the Czar that had frightened the Turks. He said that he had in mind the area of Kars, formerly in Armenia, as well as Ardahan, formerly in Georgia, and asserted that rectification of the frontier would not have been brought up at all if the Turks had not suggested an alliance with Russia. An alliance meant that both countries would defend mutually the frontiers between them and, in the Russian opinion, the frontiers in the area mentioned were incorrect, and they told the Turks that these would have to be rectified in the event of an alliance. If this was not agreeable to the Turks, he said, the question of an alliance would be dropped. He would like to know what there was to be afraid of.

With regard to the Black Sea straits, Stalin said Russia regarded the Montreux Convention as inimical. Under this treaty, he complained, Turkey had the right to block the straits not only if Turkey were at war but if it seemed to Turkey that there was a threat of war. The result was, he continued, that a small state supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet. He could imagine what commotion there would be in England if a similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez Canal, or what a commotion there would be in the United States if such a regime existed with regard to the Panama Canal. The point at issue, he concluded, was to give Soviet shipping the possibility to pass to and from the Black Sea freely. As Turkey was too weak to guarantee the possibility of free passage in case complications arose, the Soviet Union would like to see the straits defended by force.

I said that the attitude of the American government was that the Montreux Convention should be revised. I thought, however, that the straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world and that they should be guaranteed by all of us. I had come to the conclusion, I said, after a long study of history, that all the wars of the last two hundred years had originated in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier of Russia. In the last two instances the peace of the whole world had been overturned—by Austria in World War I and by Germany in this war. I thought it should be the business of this conference and of the coming peace conference to see that this did not happen again.

I announced that I was presenting a paper proposing free access to all the seas of the world by Russia and by all other countries. I was offering as a solution of the straits problem the suggestion that the Kiel Canal in Germany, the Rhine-Danube waterway from the North Sea to the Black Sea, the Black Sea straits, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal be made free waterways for the passage of freight and passengers of all countries, except for the fees for their necessary operation and maintenance.

I went on to say that we did not want the world to engage in another war in twenty-five years over the straits or the Danube. I said that our only ambition was to have a Europe that was sound economically and that could support itself. I wanted to see a Europe that would make Russia, England, France, and all other countries in it secure, prosperous, and happy, and with which the United States could trade and be happy as well as prosperous. I felt that my proposal was a step in that direction.

I said that the question of territorial concessions was a Turkish and Russian dispute which they would have to settle themselves and which the marshal had said he was willing to do. But the question of the Black Sea straits, I pointed out, concerned the United States and the rest of the world.

Churchill expressed agreement with Stalin's proposal for revision of the Montreux Convention to give Russia freedom of navigation in the straits by merchant and warships alike in peace and war. He said he also agreed with my proposal that this should be guaranteed by all of us. A guarantee by the great powers and the powers interested would certainly be effective. He earnestly hoped that the marshal would accept this alternative in contrast to that of a base in the straits in close proximity to Constantinople.

With regard to the other waterways, the British were in full accord with the general line that I had taken in my statement. Churchill thought that the Kiel Canal should certainly be free and open and guaranteed by all the great powers. He attached great importance to the free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine. He felt that there was a great measure of agreement among the three powers on this subject.

I said there was no doubt concerning agreement on the question of revising the Montreux Convention.

Stalin said he wished to withhold any statement of opinion regarding my proposal, since he would want to read it attentively before discussing it. Stalin next brought up the question of the city of Koenigsberg, pointing out that this question had been discussed at the Teheran conference. The Russians complained that all their seaports in the Baltic froze over for a period each year and that they felt it necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Stalin added that the Russians had suffered so much at the hands of Germany that they were anxious to have some piece of German territory as some small satisfaction to tens of millions of Soviet citizens. This had been agreed to, he said, by Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran, and he was anxious to see this agreement approved at this conference.

I said that I was ready to agree in principle, although it would be necessary to study the population affected and other related questions. Churchill also agreed to the concession of an ice-free port to Russia. The only question, he said, was that of the legal occasion to transfer. The Soviet draft on this subject, he pointed out, would require each of us to admit that East Prussia did not exist and also to admit that the Koenigsberg area was not under the authority of the Allied Control Council in Germany. The draft, he pointed out, would commit us to the recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. He pointed out that all these matters really belonged to the final peace settlement, but he wished to assure the marshal of his continued support of the Russian position in that part of the world. Stalin agreed that the matter would be settled at the peace conference and added that Russia was satisfied that the British and American governments approved.

Molotov then announced that the Russian delegation wished to submit a paper on the question of Syria and Lebanon and proposed that the situation in these two countries be considered by a four-power conference of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and France, with the consent of France to be first obtained.

Churchill said that the burden of defending Syria and Lebanon had fallen upon the shoulders of the British. At the time they entered Syria and Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the troops of Vichy, he said, they had made an arrangement with the French in which they both recognized Syria and Lebanon. The British, he pointed out, had told General de Gaulle that the moment he made a satisfactory treaty with Syria and Lebanon the British would withdraw their troops. He explained that if the British withdrew their troops now, it would lead to the massacre of the French civilians and the small number of troops there. This, he warned, would cause a great outbreak of turbulence and warfare in the Arab world which might affect Egypt too, and thus seriously endanger communication lines through the Suez Canal which were now being used by the Allies in the war against Japan. He expressed confidence that an agreement could be reached with the French in which de Gaulle should guarantee the independence of Syria and Lebanon and which would reserve for the French some of their cultural and commercial interests in this territory. He summed up his remarks by stating that the British would not welcome a proposal for a four-power conference on this question, which concerned only Britain, France, and the areas of Syria and Lebanon. The whole burden had been borne by the British, except for diplomatic approval of the United States which they had enjoyed. The British would not welcome the whole matter being reviewed by a body of this kind. Of course, if the United States wanted to take their place, that would be a different matter.

I replied, "No, thanks."

I pointed out that when this controversy arose there had been an exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and myself. The Prime Minister had offered to keep British troops in that region to stop the outbreak of war, I explained, and I had asked him to do so immediately in order to protect our line of communication to the Far East through the Suez Canal. I thought, however, that no country should have a special privilege such as that being considered for France. The French, I said, did not deserve a special position after the way they had stirred up all this trouble. All countries should have equal rights, I stated.

Stalin replied by noting our reluctance to have the matter discussed by a four-power group and then withdrew the Russian proposal.

This brought us to the last point on the agenda for the day-the situation in Iran.

Churchill said that the British had submitted a paper on the subject, and he would like to hear the views of the others.

Stalin remarked that the British proposals were based on the presumption that the term for the presence of Allied troops in Iran had expired. The Soviets were proceeding on the assumption, he said, that the term would not expire until after the termination of the war against Japan. He pointed out that this was stipulated by the treaty. Nevertheless, he said, the Soviet delegation concurred with the proposal that troops be withdrawn from Teheran, and he suggested that we let it go at that.

I said that we had been ready to withdraw for a long time but that we had many supplies in Iran and wished to guard them for use in the war against Japan.

Stalin said that the Russian delegation had no objection to the presence of American and British troops in Iran, but he felt that troops in Teheran might be withdrawn.

I said I thought there were no American troops in Teheran.

Stalin said that, even if there were, the Russians had no objection. He proposed that they confine themselves to the immediate withdrawal from Teheran.

Churchill said that the British were anxious to have the removal of troops continue on both sides because they had promised to withdraw when the German war was over.

Stalin said that he would have to think this over. The treaty, he said, required that troops be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of the war with Germany and her associates, and that included Japan. They had until six months after the completion of the war with Japan. This gave us plenty of time, Stalin said.

Churchill suggested that we accept the proposal to withdraw from Teheran and that we let the foreign ministers take another look at the matter when they met.

I observed that the United States was proceeding with its withdrawal because we needed our troops in the Far East. I estimated that we could be out of Iran in sixty days.

Stalin then remarked that the United States was fully entitled to look after her supplies. "So as to rid the United States of any worries," he added, "we promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran."

I thanked the marshal for this statement.

At this point British Field Marshal Alexander entered the room and shook hands with Marshal Stalin and with me. The conversation that followed had to do with the occupation of Vienna, a subject that had first come up during our fourth session. Churchill observed that with respect to the zones allotted to British and American troops, it appeared that in the British zone of Vienna there were five hundred thousand people. They would not be able to undertake the feeding of these five hundred thousand, he said, because the feeding grounds of Vienna lay to the east of the city. He suggested, therefore, a provisional arrangement under which the Russians would go on feeding them until a more permanent arrangement could be worked out. Field Marshal Alexander then supplied some additional information on the food situation in Vienna.

I said that there were about three hundred and seventy-five thousand people in our zone and that our transport system was almost totally engaged in handling supplies in the Japanese war and in supplying Italy, France, Russia, and other countries in Europe.

Stalin asked several questions and informed us that there was a temporary agreement with the Austrian government of Dr. Renner under which the Russians were going to supply some food to the Austrians. He promised to look further into the matter and to let us know within a few days what additional help he could give in the feeding of the Austrian capital.

Churchill then brought up the matter of the British elections. He in-formed Stalin and me that Mr. Attlee and he would have to be in London on the following Thursday for the elections and that they would take Eden with them. They would be back for the evening sitting on July 27. "Or some of us will be back," he added. He asked if we could meet on the Wednesday morning before his departure. This was agreed to, and it was also agreed that the foreign ministers would continue to meet and that, in Eden's absence, Sir Alexander Cadogan would represent him.

The meeting then adjourned, and at eight o'clock that evening I walked with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy to Churchill's residence, where we attended a state dinner given by the Prime Minister in honor of Generalissimo Stalin and myself.

The following morning—it was July 24—Admirals Leahy and King and Generals Marshall, Arnold, and Somervell accompanied me to the British headquarters to go over the military strategy for the next stages of the war with Japan.

On the British side, in addition to Churchill, there were Lord Leathers, the Minister of War Transport; Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham; General Sir Hastings L. Ismay; Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson; and Major General R. E. Laycock.

The British and American Chiefs of Staff had held daily meetings since our arrival at Potsdam and now placed before us the draft of their final report to Churchill and me. We examined it paragraph by paragraph. The unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible moment was the main objective of the strategy. Churchill and I approved the report in full. Some of the main strategic aims as stated in this report were:

In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist, by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and venal strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required;

In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria;

The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith would be the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources would be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion would be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations would be undertaken which might hazard the success of, or delay of, these main operations;

Russian entry into the war against Japan should be encouraged. Such aid to her war-making capacity as might be necessary should be provided;

Such measures as might be necessary and practicable should be taken in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan;

The control of operation strategy in the Pacific theater would remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff;

The United States Chiefs of Staff would provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions;

In the event the U.S.S.R. entered the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned;

The British Pacific Fleet would participate as at present planned;

A British very long range bomber force of 10 squadrons, increasing to 20 squadrons when more airfields became available, participate;

It was agreed that the appropriate British commanders and staff should visit Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff;

For the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan should be 15 November 1946 and this date should be adjusted periodically to conform to the courses of the war.

That same day, in the afternoon, the Combined Chiefs met for the first and only time with the Russian Chiefs of Staff: General Antonov, the Red Army Chief of Staff; Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov of the People's Commissariat for the Navy; and Marshal of Aviation Fallalev, the Chief of the Soviet Air Staff. Antonov was accompanied by his deputy, Lieutenant General Slavin. Admiral Leahy presided at the meeting, and later he and General Marshall gave me a detailed report.

The primary purpose was to co-ordinate strategy in the Far East, an important step toward bringing Russia into the war on our side. General Antonov reported that Soviet troops were being concentrated in the Far East in order to be ready to start operations against the Japanese in the latter half of August. The exact date, he informed our military leaders, would depend on the satisfactory completion of the negotiations with the Chinese.

Antonov defined the Russian objective in the Far East to be the destruction of the Japanese in Manchuria and the occupation of the Liao-tung Peninsula. After the defeat of the Japanese, he said, it was the intention of the Soviets to withdraw all Soviet troops from Manchuria.

General Marshall then informed the Russians of the general disposition of Japanese troop strength as known to us. He gave them a very general picture of our position in the Pacific and discussed some possible courses of action open to the Japanese. Admiral King and General Arnold discussed the effect of sea and air activities against the Japanese forces.

General Antonov showed particular interest in any intentions we might have to undertake operations against the Kuriles or in Korea. He was told by Admiral King that we would not be able to operate against the Kuriles but that a line of communications could be maintained through that island chain without the seizure of any of the islands.

General Marshall stated that we had no present plans for amphibious operations against Korea. From our point of view, he explained, such a move would require an undue amount of shipping, and it was the belief of our experts that Korea could be brought under control without difficulty once our aircraft could operate from fields on the Japanese island of Kyushu.

Admiral Leahy reported that the meeting was friendly.

Another meeting was held two days later, on July 26, but with only the Americans and the Russians present. The primary purpose was to receive the Russian answers to a number of questions of detail which General Marshall had given them. In their answers the Russians agreed to the establishment of weather stations at Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk and, although initially reluctant, they agreed at the meeting that American personnel should man these stations.

Agreement was also reached on lines to mark off areas of operation for the respective air and naval forces. These ran generally from the northern tip of Japan across extreme northern Korea. No lines were set up for land operations since it was not anticipated by our military leaders that we would carry out operations to Korea.

The two military groups also agreed to exchange liaison groups, including a Soviet military mission in Washington, and to make designated ports and airfields in Siberia available to our units for repair needs and emergency use. The Russians took pains to point out that all these agreements would become effective only upon Russia's entry into the war against Japan, but the general atmosphere of this meeting, like the one before, was one of co-operation and friendship.

At the eighth session of the heads of government, on July 24, we were again dealing with the question of peace treaties and interim arrangements with Italy and the other satellites. I had agreed to include the eastern satellites in a redraft of my original proposal, and this new version of was now placed before us by Secretary Byrnes.

The bitterest debate of the conference now developed, the point at issue being that Stalin wanted us to recognize the puppet governments he had installed in the satellite countries overrun by the Russian armies.

Stalin said an abnormal distinction was being drawn between Italy and the other satellite states, as if Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland belonged in the category of leprous states. In such a distinction he saw a danger that attempts would be made to discredit the Soviet Union and asked whether the Italian government was any more democratic or responsible than the governments of the other countries. No democratic elections had been held in Italy, he said.

I replied to Stalin that everybody had free access to Italy—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and other nation—but we had not been able to have free access to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and had not been able to get information concerning them. When Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were set up on a basis giving us free access to them, I declared, then we would recognize them, but not sooner. I said I was asking for the reorganization of the other satellite governments along democratic lines, as had been agreed upon at Yalta.

Stalin objected to the words "responsible and democratic governments" in the draft, saying that they should be deleted, since they served to discredit these countries. I pointed out that this language was necessary to show that the only way in which they could obtain our support for entry into the United Nations was for them to have democratic governments. Stalin said that these were not fascist governments. There was a far less democratic government in Argentina, he pointed out, which in spite of this had been admitted to the United Nations.

Churchill said he would like to put in a plea for Italy. He said he had considerable sympathy for Italy because there was no censorship there, there had been a considerable growth of freedom, and now the north was going to have democratic elections. He did not see why the Big Three should not discuss peace with them. With regard to Rumania, and particularly to Bulgaria, he added, the British knew nothing. Their mission in Bucharest, he asserted, had been penned up with a closeness approaching internment.

Stalin broke in to ask if it were really possible for Churchill to cite such facts that had not been verified.

Churchill said that the British knew this by their representatives there. Stalin would be very much astonished, he stated, to read a long catalogue of difficulties encountered by their mission there. An iron fence, he charged, had come down around them.

Stalin interrupted to exclaim, "All fairy tales." Churchill rejoined that statesmen could call one another's statements fairy tales if they wished. He expressed complete confidence in his representatives in Bucharest and said that the conditions in the British mission there had caused him the greatest distress.

I stated that, in the case of the United States, we had been much concerned about the many difficulties encountered by our missions in Rumania and Bulgaria.

The exchange continued sharp and lengthy, and I suggested that the question again be referred to the foreign ministers for redrafting.

Next on the agenda was a renewal of the discussion regarding the Black Sea straits. I inquired if my paper on inland waterways had been considered.

Stalin remarked that this paper did not deal with the question of Turkey and the straits but dealt with the Danube and the Rhine. The Soviet delegation, he said, would like to receive a reply to their proposal of a Russo-Turkish treaty regarding the Black Sea straits. I replied that it was my wish that the two questions be considered together.

Stalin said he was afraid that we would not be able to reach an agreement in regard to the straits, since our views differed so widely. He suggested that we postpone the question and take up the next one.

Churchill said he understood that it was agreed that freedom in the Black Sea straits should be approved and guaranteed by the Big Three and other powers. He observed that my proposal to join in an organization to free the waterways of the world was, to his mind, a remarkable and important fact.

I stated that the Prime Minister had clearly presented the position of the United States in this matter and agreed with him that this would be a big step.

Churchill said he hoped that the guarantee proposed by the President would be considered by Stalin as more than a substitute for fortification of the straits.

Molotov asked if the Suez Canal was operated under such a principle.

Churchill rejoined that it was open in war and in peace to all.

Molotov asked whether the Suez Canal were under the same international control as was proposed for the Black Sea straits.

Churchill observed that this question had not been raised.

Molotov retorted, "I'm raising it." If it was such a good rule, he said, why not apply it to the Suez?

Churchill explained that the British had an arrangement with which they were satisfied and under which they had operated for some seventy years without complaints.

Molotov charged that there had been a lot of complaints. "You should ask Egypt," he said.

Eden intervened to point out that Egypt had signed the treaty with England.

Molotov said that the British had asserted that international control was better.

Molotov did a lot of talking at Potsdam. He and Stalin, along with Trotsky and Lenin, were among the old Bolsheviki of the 1917 Revolution. Molotov would take the bit in his teeth and talk as if he were the Russian state, until Stalin would smile and say a few words to him in Russian, and he would change his tune.

I often felt that Molotov kept some facts from Stalin or that he would not give him all the facts until he had to. It was always harder to get agreement out of Molotov than out of Stalin. Where Stalin could smile and relax at times, Molotov always gave the impression that he was constantly pressing.

Churchill said that the suggestion of international control of the inland waterways had been made to meet the Russian position that Russia should be able to move freely in and out of the Black Sea, and that his government was prepared to join in a guarantee with other nations and was prepared to press it on Turkey. Freedom of the seas could be attained in this way without trouble to Turkey, he said. He agreed that the question must be put off, but he hoped that the 'tremendous fact that they had heard at this meeting" should not be underestimated by their Russian friends.

I said I wished to make clear my understanding of an international guarantee of the freedom of the straits; it meant that any nation had free ingress for any purpose whatever. I did not contemplate any fortifications of any kind, I added.

We agreed that each of us would study the problem of the straits. Before proceeding with any further business, I pointed out that the conference would have to be wound up in not more than a week or ten days and that a communiqué' would have to be prepared. I proposed that a committee be appointed to start working on it and suggested that the foreign ministers make a proposal to us on the following day.

I stated that I was anxious to do as much work as possible, because when there was nothing more upon which we could agree I was returning home. I had a great deal of business waiting for me in Washington, I added.

Churchill said that he could not stay longer than August 6, as both he and Mr. Attlee would have to be in England by the eighth for the new Parliament.

The occupation of Vienna was the final item for our consideration. Stalin announced that he had talked to Marshal Konev and that the U.S.S.R. was ready to continue to issue rations to all zones in Vienna until such time as the British and Americans found it possible to make some other arrangements.

I had come to Potsdam with a draft of an ultimatum calling upon the Japanese to surrender which I intended to discuss with Churchill. This was to be a joint declaration by the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. I waited until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached an agreement on our military strategy before I gave him a copy of the draft on July 24. Churchill was as anxious as I was for the Russians to come into the Japanese war. He felt, as did our military leaders, that Russia's entry would hasten Japanese defeat. At the same time, Churchill agreed quickly to the principle of the proposed declaration and said he would take the copy with him for further study of the text.

Stalin could not, of course, be a party to the proclamation itself since he was still at peace with Japan, but I considered it desirable to advise him of the move we intended to make. I spoke to him privately about this in the course of the conference meeting.

Churchill and I agreed that Chiang Kai-shek should be asked to join in the issuance of the document and that China should be listed as one of the sponsoring governments. Accordingly I sent the text of the proposed document to Ambassador Hurley at Chungking with instructions to obtain the generalissimo's concurrence without delay. The message went through naval channels and also through the Army's signal setup. But for more than twenty4our hours there was neither reply nor acknowledgment. Churchill was about to return to London to learn the results of the election, but before he left he transmitted his approval of the wording of the proclamation and agreed to have me issue the document at my discretion.

July 25 was the day Winston Churchill would have to leave the conference, and Stalin and I, to accommodate him, had agreed to meet in the morning. Before we went into this, the ninth meeting of the conference, Churchill, Stalin, and I posed in the palace garden for the first formal photographs of the conference.

The ninth session got under way with a discussion of the now familiar topic of Poland's western frontier. Churchill said that he had had a talk with President Bierut and that Mr. Eden had seen the Polish delegation for two hours last evening. The Poles were all in agreement, he reported, that about one and one half million Germans were left in the area in the west which was under discussion.

I observed that this was true. I added that the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, had talked with the Poles and expected to have more talks with them.

Churchill said that he thought the question of transfer of populations from Germany and Czechoslovakia and Poland should be discussed. He pointed out that the Poles were evacuating Germans from an occupational zone. This area was part of the Russian zone, and Poles were driving the Germans out. He felt that this ought not to be done without consideration being given to the question of food supply, reparations, and other matters which had not yet been decided. The result was that the Poles had little food and fuel, he said, and that the British had a mass of population thrown on them.

Stalin remarked that we should appreciate the position in which the Poles found themselves. They were taking revenge on the Germans, he said, for the injuries the Germans had caused them in the course of centuries. Churchill pointed out that their revenge took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British zones to be fed.

I expressed full agreement with the Prime Minister that this should not be tolerated. If the Poles were to have a zone, I repeated, this matter should be considered very carefully. The occupying powers of Germany were Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States. If the Poles were in a zone, they were responsible to the Soviet Union for it. I stated that I wanted to be as helpful as I could, and the position I had taken was that the frontier should be fixed at the peace conference.

At this point I thought it necessary to tell what my powers as President were with respect to the question of the treaty of peace. When we were discussing matters appropriate for inclusion in the peace treaties, I stated, I wanted all to understand that under the Constitution of the United States a treaty could be concluded only with the consent of the United States Senate. I assured them that when I supported a proposal at the conference I would use my best efforts to support the matter when it came up for consideration in the Senate. This did not preclude, however, my coming back and saying that I considered the political sentiment in the United States was such that I could not press the matter without the danger of injuring our mutual relations. I explained that I was making these remarks not in order to change the basis of any discussion with my colleagues, nor to change the basis upon which the discussions with President Roosevelt had been held, but to make clear what my constitutional powers were. I had to consider these matters, I continued, from the standpoint of the people of the United States, and I wished to be able to be in a position to get the best arrangements approved by the Senate. I concluded by saying that I was convinced that world peace could be maintained only by the co-operation of the three major powers present at the table.

Stalin inquired if my remarks referred only to the peace treaties or to the whole discussion. I replied that I was referring only to those agreements or treaties that had to go to the Senate for ratification. I had large war powers, I pointed out, but I did not wish to abuse these powers to the point where they might endanger the conclusion of peace. Furthermore, I explained, I always wanted to have the full support of the American people for my policies.

Stalin said that he understood. Churchill, I know, understood.

Stalin took the position that, in the discussion of German supplies and production, coal and steel were much more important than food. Stalin, I could see, saw his opportunity here to bargain for access to the resources of the Ruhr basin. And now he argued that the yield of this German industrial area should be made available to all of Germany, as Churchill argued that East German food supplies should be.

Churchill replied that the British themselves were short of coal because they were exporting to Holland, France, and Belgium. They were denying themselves to supply these countries; the coming winter would be the most nearly fireless one of the war for the people of England.

Stalin replied that the Russian situation was still worse than that of the British. The Russians had lost more than five million men in this war and were short of coal and other things. He was afraid, he said, that if he started describing the situation in Russia he would make Churchill burst into tears.

Churchill insisted that he was still eager to barter coal from the Ruhr in exchange for food for the German population, and Stalin agreed that this question must be discussed. Churchill replied that he did not expect a decision today but he hoped for one soon. Furthermore, he did not think we should consider that we had yet solved the major problems. So far as he was concerned we had only exchanged views.

A few more interchanges followed, and Churchill, referring to his departure the following day for the British elections, announced that he had finished.

"What a pity," Stalin quipped.

"I hope to be back," Churchill replied.

Stalin remarked in reply that, judging from the expression on Mr. Attlee's face, he did not think Mr. Attlee was looking forward to taking over Churchill's authority.

With the end of the ninth meeting the conference was adjourned until the return of the British delegation from England.

At the time Churchill left for London, we were still without an answer from Chiang Kai-shek. The message to him had met with more than its share of difficulties. First there had been a delay in its transmission at the Honolulu communications center. Then heavy traffic between Honolulu and Guam had slowed its way. But it had finally reached Hurley at 8:35 P.M. Chungking time.

Ambassador Hurley radioed that the statement to the Japanese people had been delivered to Prime Minister Soong, but the generalissimo was out of Chungking, in the mountains across the Yangtze River. He said the message would be translated and delivered to Chiang that night. Hurley then described the difficulty of reaching Chiang: "The translation was not finished until after midnight. We then had difficulty in procuring a ferry across the Yangtze. The prime minister declined to go out to Yellow Mountain with me in the night. This morning, K. C. Wu, Assistant Minister of Foreign Relations, accompanied me to the Generalissimo's residence at Yellow Mountain. The Generalissimo read the translation carefully, and then K. C. Wu interpreted my explanation of the necessity for immediate concurrence. The Generalissimo was kindly and courteous throughout. After he had told me that he concurred in the proclamation, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, the Minister of Information, arrived at the conference. It became necessary to explain the whole situation again to Wang. Incidentally, Wang is to succeed the Prime Minister as Minister of Foreign Relations. When Chiang Kai-shek had approved the message of concurrence, we found the telephone out of order. It was necessary for me to return to Chungking to contact facilities to make transmission to you.

Chiang Kai-shek had concurred with one reservation: He wanted us to change the order in which we listed the heads of the three sponsoring governments in order to put him ahead of the British Prime Minister, because it would help him at home. The proclamation was changed to accommodate Chiang Kai-shek.

At nine-twenty on the night of July 26 I issued the joint proclamation from Berlin. This was the ultimatum that came to be known as the "Potsdam Declaration." I directed the Office of War Information in Washington to begin immediately to get this message to the Japanese people in every possible way. Here is the Proclamation:

PROCLAMATION BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS, UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND CHINA

1. We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.
3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.
4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.
5. Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
7. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.
11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
13. We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
14. As there was no meeting on July 26, I left early in the morning by plane for Frankfurt. General Eisenhower, Lieutenant General Wade H. Haislip, Major General Harold R. Bull, and Brigadier General Doyle 0. Hickey greeted me and the members of my party at the airport in Frankfurt.

I began my inspection of the various units of the 3rd Armored Division under General Hickey's command as we drove through Frankfurt in an open car. The various units were lined up alongside the road for a distance of approximately thirty miles.

Arriving at the town of Heppenheim, I was greeted by an honor guard from the 84th Infantry Division, known as the "Railsplitters." This division was under Major General A. R. Bolling's command. After the honors, the hundred-piece band of the 84th Division softly played "The Missouri Waltz" while I inspected the guard of honor. After addressing a few remarks to the guard, I entered General Eisenhower's armored car and with General Boiling we began the long drive to the latter's headquarters in Weinheim.

The route led through several very picturesque little German villages that seemed to be totally unscathed by the ravages of war. As a war reminder, however, there remained signs along the road that read, "Mineswept to ditch."

Just before noon we arrived at General Bolling's headquarters, a beautiful chateau that had formerly been the home of German royalty. The house was handsomely furnished, and apparently nothing had been altered to change its original appearance. In one corner of the main room hung a red flag inscribed, "Russian 32nd Cavalry Smolensk Division Greets the 84th Railsplitter Division," which the Soviets had presented to General Bolling when the two Allied divisions had met on the Elbe.

After luncheon at General Bolling's headquarters, where I visited with a cousin of mine, Colonel L. W. Truman, General Bolling's chief of staff, I resumed my inspection of the 84th Division. In the first group were about four hundred and fifty men, all from Missouri. As I walked down

the line I singled out several of the men to inquire what their home towns were and to discover what mutual acquaintances we might have.

After a brief talk to the group I ended by telling them that I did not want to keep them in the hot sun any longer to listen to me, since I was not running for office and since they couldn't vote for me anyway. Continuing in the armored vehicle, we drove along the road with men of the 84th Division lining both sides of the road in single file for a distance of more than seven miles. Then we left the area and returned to Frankfurt via the autobahn. The German autobahns by-pass all cities, and we were told that the Germans had no speed laws for traffic using them.

Arriving in Frankfurt, I visited General Eisenhower's headquarters. The big yellow building composed of many wings, slightly reminiscent of the Pentagon in Washington, was noticeably unbombed amid Frankfurt's general desolation. It once housed the central offices of the vast I. G. Farben industries.

Returning to the airport, I made presentation of the Distinguished Service Medal to four high-ranking officers of the United Kingdom Army and Air Forces for exceptionally meritorious service. After the presentation, the same units that had greeted me in the morning passed in review before their Commander in Chief. Our plane left immediately for Gatow airport, and by 7 P.M. I was back in Babelsberg.

Captain John B. Ross, son of my press secretary, Charles Ross, and Major Alfred K. Lee, a personal friend of mine and son of former Congressman Frank Lee, were dinner guests at the Little White House that evening. Captain Ross spent several days in Babelsberg visiting with his father. Other callers included General Marshall and Ambassador Harriman.

On the same day I received the following invitation from Prime Minister Churchill in London:

"Assuming your departure would be 6th or 7th it would be very agreeable if you would come by air to Plymouth and join Augusta there. Your privacy between the airfield and the ship would be carefully protected. The King feels he would not like you to touch our shores without having an opportunity of meeting you. He would therefore be in a British cruiser in Plymouth Sound and would be very glad if you would lunch with him. He would then pay a return visit to the Augusta before she sailed. I hope these arrangements will be convenient to you."

I replied: "I fully expect to get away from Terminal earlier than August 6th and I will give you as much advance notice as possible.

"Your permission to join the Augusta at Plymouth is accepted with appreciation. I will be very much pleased to meet with the expressed desires of His Majesty at Plymouth if my necessity for early departure for Washington meets entirely with his convenience."

On the following day, July 27, there was again no meeting of the conference, since the British delegation had not yet returned to Babelsberg.

I worked on my mail during the forenoon and conferred during the day with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. Joseph Davies called on me during the early evening, and that night Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, special assistant to the President, arrived from Washington and joined our party. At "Colors" I was so impressed with the quality of the bugling as the flag was lowered that I walked across the lawn to congratulate the buglers personally. That evening I also enjoyed the piano playing of Sergeant List.

On July 28 I wrote my mother and sister Mary:

Dear Mama & Mary:-Well here another week has gone, and I'm still in the Godforsaken country awaiting the return of a new British Prime Minister. I had hoped we'd be finished by now, but there are some loose ends to clean up, and we must meet again to do it.

I went to Frankfurt and inspected two American divisions on Thursday, the 3rd Armored and 84th Infantry Divisions.

Lewis Truman, Ralph's boy, is the Chief of Staff and Asst. Div. Commander of the 84th. He is a nice boy and a good officer. He is a full Colonel now. I saw a lot of Missourians and a lot of good American soldiers. In most of the regiments they had the Missourians all in one place. I saw men from all over the state and talked to them.

When we were going through the 3rd Armored I made the remark that I'd seen a lot of Missourians but no South Carolinians, kidding Mr. Byrnes, who was in the car behind me. The soldier who was driving the car stood it as long as he could and finally, much to the pained surprise of the General who was riding with me, spoke up and said he was from Mr. Byrnes' home town, Spartanburg. I stopped the caravan and brought Jim up and introduced him. The kid lived just around the corner from him.

That part of Germany where we made the inspection looks much different from Berlin and its surrounding territory. The children and the people looked well fed and seemed in better spirits.

The big towns like Frankfurt and Darrnstadt were destroyed, but the small ones are intact. It is awful to see what the bombs did to the towns, railroads, and bridges. To think that millions of Russians, Poles, English and Americans were slaughtered all for the folly of one crazy egotist by the name of Hitler. I hope it won't happen again.

There was a lieutenant in one of those Missouri artillery outfits I inspected named Hitler. He was from St. Louis. We had lunch with the 84th Division, finished the inspection and went back to Frankfurt where I pinned some four medals on 3 Englishmen and a Canadian.

It was the best day I've had here. Hope you are both well. I am hoping to leave here some day soon. Maybe next Tuesday or Wednesday.

Love to you both.

Harry