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Yasukuni Shrine
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Students at Yasukuni

The main building of Yasukuni Shrine
Yasukuni Shrine (靖国神社, Yasukuni Jinja?) (literally "peaceful nation shrine") is a controversialShinto shrine located inTokyo,Japan dedicated to the spirits ofsoldiers who died fighting on behalf of theJapanese emperor.
As of October2004, its Book of Souls lists the names of 2,466,532 Japanese and former colonialsoldiers killed in war. The Yasukuni Shrine since 1978 also honors a total of 1,068 convicted Japanesewar criminals, including 14executed Class A war criminals, a fact which has engendered protests in a number of neighboring countries who believe their presence indicates a failure on the part of Japan to fully atone for its military past.
Current Japanese Prime MinisterJunichiro Koizumi‘s successive visits to the shrine, since 2001, have been a significant cause of outcries inChina,South Korea, and other countries.
Contents
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1 History2 Kami3 Controversy3.1 Political impact3.2 Debate in Japan3.3 Recent events
4 Further reading4.1 The controversy
5 See also6 References7 External links
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History
The Yasukuni Shrine was originally constructed in June1869 by order of theMeiji Emperor to commemorate the victims of theBoshin War. It was one of the principal shrines associated withState Shinto. Originally named Tōkyō Shōkonsha (東京招魂社), the shrine was renamed Yasukuni Jinja in1879. The shrine has performed Shinto rites to house thekami (spirits) of all Japanese and former colonial soldiers (Korean and Taiwanese) who have died in conflicts since then. It also enshrines any members of the JapaneseSelf-Defence Forces who have died on duty. In regard to the Boshin War and South West War, dead from Tokugawa Shogunate (particularly from Aizu province) and Satsuma province are not enshrined because they are considered enemies of the emperor. This exclusion is deeply resented in both provinces. It should be noted that enshrinements are carried out unilaterally by the Shrine. Some families have requested that their members should be delisted. The Yasukuni priesthood has turned down such requests, stating that once a kami is enshrined, it has been ‘merged‘ and cannot be separated.
After Japan‘s defeat inWorld War II, the US-ledOccupation Authorities ordered Yasukuni to either become a secular government institution, or a religious institution that is independent from theJapanese government. Yasukuni chose the latter. Since that time, Yasukuni has been privately funded.
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Kami
The following lists the number enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine from each war Japan has participated in since the shrine‘s founding.
Boshin War (civil war,1867–68): 7,751Southwest War (civil war,1877): 6,971Taiwan Expedition (Suppression ofTaiwanese aborigines who murderedRyukyuan Fisher, Territorial dispute withQing-China,1874): 1,130First Sino-Japanese War (Conflict withQing-China overKorea,1894–95): 13,619Boxer Rebellion (Eight-Nation Alliance‘s suppression of Chinese revolt,1901: 1,256Russo-Japanese War (Conflict withRussian Empire overKorea andManchuria,1904–05): 88,429World War I (Conflict withGerman Empire (Central Powers) overChinese Shandong,1914–18): 4,850Jinan Incident (Conflict withChina (Kuomintang) overChinese Jinan,1928): 185Mukden Incident (Invasion ofManchuria,1931): 17,176Second Sino-Japanese War (Invasion ofChina between1937–1941): 191,243World War II (Invasion ofAsia and conflict with theUnited States and otherAllied forces): 2,133,885
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Controversy
The shrine honors askami the spirits of those who have fought on behalf of the emperor, regardless of whether they died in combat. Still, about 1,000 of the enshrined spirits werePOWs executed forwar crimes duringWorld War II. The main criterion for enshrinement for war dead is that a person should be listed as having died while on duty (including death from illness or disease) in the war dead registry of the Japanese government. The Japanese government lists all executed A, B, and C class war criminals as such for technical reasons to ensure that the remaining family members can receive a pension. OnOctober 17,1978, 14 Class Awar criminals (according to the judgment of theInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East), includingHideki Tojo, were quietly enshrined as "Martyrs ofShōwa" (昭和殉難者 Shōwa junnansha), ostensibly on the technicality that they were on the registry. They are listed below, according to their sentences:
Death by hanging:Hideki Tojo,Itagaki Seishiro,Heitaro Kimura,Kenji Doihara,Iwane Matsui,Akira Muto,Koki Hirota
Lifetime imprisonment:Yoshijiro Umezu,Kuniaki Koiso,Kiichiro Hiranuma,Toshio Shiratori
20-year imprisonment:Shigenori Togo
Died before a judicial decision was reached (due to illness or disease):Osami Nagano,Yosuke Matsuoka
When this was revealed to the media onApril 19,1979, it started a controversy which continues to this day. ForChina,North andSouth Korea,Taiwan, and other nations that suffered from Japanese military aggression and/or occupation, the shrine is a symbol of Japanesemilitarism andright-wingnationalism. Liberal, socialist and communist groups in Japan also take issue with the shrine for similar reasons.
More importantly, Yasukuni Shrine operates amuseum on thehistory of Japan (the Yūshūkan, 遊就館) which outside observers have criticized as presenting arevisionist interpretation. A documentary-style video shown to museum visitors portrays Japan‘s conquest ofEast Asia during the pre-World War II period as an effort to save the region from the imperial advances ofWestern powers. Displays deny that events such as theNanking Massacre took place and systematically portray Japan as a victim of foreign influence, especially Western pressure.
A pamphlet published by the shrine says: "War is a really tragic thing to happen, but it was necessary in order for us to protect the independence of Japan and to prosper together with our Asian neighbors." It also says that Japanese POWs executed for war crimes were "cruelly and unjustly tried" by a "sham-like tribunal of the Allied forces".
The shrine‘sEnglish language website defends Japanese occupation and aggression prior to and during World War II, by stating the following: "War is truly sorrowful. Yet to maintain the independence and peace of the nation and for the prosperity of all of Asia, Japan was forced into conflict."[1]
After the revelation by the media,Emperor Hirohito stopped paying visits to Yasukuni Shrine and his successor,Emperor Akihito, has also refrained from doing so. However, the imperial court still sends an emissary to the shrine, to which all Japanese Shinto shrines are entitled. Moreover, there are strong voices in right wing circles urging the Emperor to visit the shrine and honor the dead.
The political overtones of Yasukuni Shrine are attributed to two major factors. One is the ideology of State Shinto which regarded any wars waged in the name of the emperor as just and anyone who died fighting for the emperor as an ‘eirei‘ (hero spirit). But another more immediate factor is the influence of various support organizations, especially the Izokukai (遺族会), the largest organization representing the families of war dead from World War Two. Though Yasukuni has become something of a mecca for various right-wing and ultra right-wing organizations, their influence on the Yasukuni priesthood is said to be marginal at best. On the other hand, Yasukuni Shrine considers the Izokukai as the de facto lay organization for the Shrine. The Izokukai was formerly known as the Izoku Kōsei Renmei (遺族厚生連盟 War-Dead-Family Welfare Union), established in 1947. The original purpose of the Izoku Kōsei Renmei was stated as follows: "With a view to pursuing the end of warfare, establishing global peace and world prosperity and contributing to the welfare of the humanity, we seek to provide relief and assistance to the families of those who died in the (Asia Pacific) war ". As can be seen, the main purpose of the organization was to provide assistance to the widows, orphans and aging parents of those who died in the Asia Pacific War as well as lobbying the government in the interests of the family. However, in 1953 the organization became a trust foundation and changed its name to the current Izokukai. More importantly, the main purpose of the organization was changed to, "In pursuit of the establishiment of a peaceful Japan, the cultivation of character, and the promotion of morality, we seek to praise ‘eirei‘ (hero spirits), to promote the welfare of the families of the war dead, and to seek recognition and compensation for civilian auxiliary units." The change, which included the elimination of international pacifism and insertion of a reference to ‘eirei‘ is regarded as giving a nationalist slant to the character of the organization. Chairmen of the organization have usually been members of the governing Liberal Democratic party and the organization is regarded as the informal pipeline between the LDP (hence the government) and the Yasukuni Shrine. In 1962 Okinori Kaya, a known LDP hawk and a convicted class A criminal in the Tokyo Trials was appointed chairman. The organization is regarded as having strong influence over the political overtones of the Yasukuni Shrine.
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Political impact
The controversial nature of the shrine has figured largely in both domestic Japanese politics and relations with other Asian countries. Four Japaneseprime ministers have visited the shrine since 1979:Yasuhiro Nakasone in1985;Miyazawa Kiichi in1992 (though this visit was kept secret until 1996);Ryutaro Hashimoto in1996; andJunichiro Koizumi, who has visited five times to date (2001,2002,2003,2004, and2005). Visits by Japanese prime ministers to the shrine have resulted in official condemnation by neighboring countries, as they see it as an attempt to legitimize Japan‘s pastmilitarism.
Visits to the shrine are also controversial in the domestic debate over the proper role of religion in Japanese government. SomeLiberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians insist that visits are protected by the constitutional right to freedom of religion and that it is appropriate for legislators to pay their respects to those fallen in war. However, proposals for the construction of asecular memorial so that those wishing to honor Japan‘s military dead do not have to visit Yasukuni have thus far failed, ostensibly for technical details rather than the rejection of a secular memorial. The Japanese government conducts yearly memorial services to commemorate the War in Budokan (a secular building) which is near Yasukuni shrine so that the attendees can later visit Yasukuni Shrine privately if they so wish. The shrine itself objects to any proposal that a non-religious memorial be built, stating that "Yasukuni Shrine must be the one and only memorial for Japan‘s military dead." Koizumi has claimed that his visits are to ensure that there will be no further wars involving Japan, causing some to interpret them as an act of remembrance rather than reverence.
On his first visit to Japan since leaving office in February2003, formerSouth Korean PresidentKim Dae Jung openly criticized Japanese politicians‘ visits to the shrine, and proposed that the 14 Class A war criminals be moved to a different location. He said, "If that option is realized, I will not express opposition to visits to Yasukuni Shrine (by Koizumi or other Japanese leaders)". Kim noted that Koizumi promised at a meeting inShanghai in 2001 to consider building a new memorial facility that could replace Yasukuni Shrine and enable anyone to worship there without hesitation.
The government of the People‘s Republic of China has been the most vocal critic of the shrine and some Japanese observers have suggested that the issue of Yasukuni Shrine is just as heavily tied to China‘s internal politics as it is to the historical conduct of Japan‘s military and its perceived remorse for its actions. They state that tolerance on the part ofChinese Communist Party authorities for large-scale public protests in mainland China against the shrine contrasts strongly with the authority exercised against any kind of domestic political dissent. This has been interpreted as an effort by the party to channel public frustrations away from their rule, and preserve their legitimacy by aligning themselves with popularnationalist sentiments. Many have commented on the cultural difference between Chinese and Japanese cultures. Japanese culture, unlike Chinese culture, views one‘s crimes absolved after death.
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Debate in Japan
Overseas, visits to the shrine are widely regarded as wrong, insensitive and/or politically incorrect. In Japan, although demands by ultra-nationalists to nationalize Yasukuni Shrine as a part of their ongoing campaign to re-establish State Shinto are widely ridiculed and ignored, there is no consensus in regard to visits to Yasukuni Shrine by the Prime Minister.
One commonly voiced argument is that visits to the Shrine by the Prime Minister (or for that matter, the Emperor) are an internal political matter in which China and Korea have no right to interfere. Therefore, the visits should continue. Others point out that this argument merely asserts that visits should continue so that Japan does not lose face, avoiding the question whether it is right for the Prime Minister to visit the Shrine in the first place.
Another line of argument is that the issue is a mere difference of religious sentiment between Japan and the Koreans and Chinese. Shinto theology does not contain the concept ofkarma orheaven andhell seen in other religions. Though certain kami who die with unavenged grievances could become vengeful kami and require enshrinement to placate them, Japanese Shinto is noted for the total absence of retribution after death. China and Korea, with a different tradition, actually have monuments condemning individuals considered to have committed grievous sins either against the state or humanity. According to this argument, the perceived offence is purely due to misunderstanding by China and Korea. However, the counterargument is that such an interpretation cannot be reasonably applied to Yasukuni, which is not an ordinary Shinto shrine but is in fact a symbol of State Shintoism of the pre-war era and asserts ultra-nationalism and divinity of the living emperor. Moreover, they point out that Yasukuni Shrine does not merely house kami for the purpose of calming vengeful or sorrowful kami. Instead, it and its nearby museum praise them asmartyrs with various theological interpretations specifically designed to emphasize its (ultra) nationalistic version of Shintoism. Moreover, the museum and website make it clear that the institution is a quasi-political institution which glorifies the "divine" Japanese empire that is protected by kami.Souvenirs of items used by the Japanese Imperial Army, including war flags, can be purchased at the museum gift shop immediately adjacent to the shrine.
Another controversy is the constitutionality of visits by the Prime Minister. In the Japanese Constitution, theseparation of state and religion is explicit, unlike the American counterpart which is somewhat implicit. Because the clause was written for the express purpose of preventing the return of State Shintoism, many question the consitutionality of the Prime Minister visiting Yasukuni Shrine. Often the first question Japanese Prime Ministers are asked by journalists after a visit is "Are you here as a private person or as Prime Minister?". In addition, whether the Prime Minister has signed the visitors‘ book indicating the position of signator as shijin (private person) or shushō (prime minister) is diligently reported. All Prime Ministers have so far stated that their visit was private. However, although some leave the signature section blank or sign it as shijin, others sign it as shushō (Prime Minister). The issue is somewhat the opposite of visits by the German Chancellor to the Holocaust Memorial, which are explictly made in the context of a state visit. Prime Minister Koizumi recently gave a somewhat cryptic answer, stating that he visited the shrine as Junichiro Koizumi, the Prime Minister of Japan. Some consider such statement as a move towards making visits somewhat official; others consider that it is pointing out that the whole issue of shijin vs shusho is somewhat farcical. Currently, most of the Japanese public and most jurists agree that there is no constitutional violation as long as the Prime Minister does not represent it as a state visit.
However, a more controversial point is the appropriateness of visits in light of the views expressed by Yasukuni Shrine through its museum and website. Both sites make it clear that Yasukuni Shrine does not regard the conduct of Japan during the World War II as an act of aggression but rather matter of self defence and a heroic effort to repelEuropean Imperialism. This is in direct conflict with the government position in this matter. Though, for example, no one would question the President of the U.S. for attending a church service every Sunday, there would be an outcry and possible impeachment if he regularly attended services held by a church which had a website or museum openly claiming that slavery or segregation was justified. Defenders of (private) visits by the Prime Minister point out that there is no other venue to pay respect to the fallen in Japan, so that Prime Minister as well as the large number of Japanese who visit the shrine have no choice. Moreover, most people (including the Prime Minister) who visit Yasukuni deliberately avoid entering the museum so that the visit remains personal and religious rather than political. Somewhat surprisingly, criticism by China and Korea in regard to the visits concentrates mainly on the enshrinement of A class war criminals and not on the political views of Yasukuni Shrine itself.
In Japan there is a widespread understanding that the controversy will not go away unless something is changed. A number of proposals have been made, the simplest being to remove A class criminals and enshrine them in a separate place so that visitors to Yasukuni Shrine do not have to pay their respects to war criminals. This is the solution demanded by China and Korea. But because of the constitutional separation of church and state, the Japanese government cannot request Yasukuni Shrine to do so. Moreover, Yasukuni Shrine is adamant that once a kami has been merged into the shrine, it cannot be separated, although it has been pointed out that there are some historical precedents in Shinto rituals where certain kami which were jointly housed in a particular shrine have been rehoused separatedly. The governing Liberal Democratic Party is said to be communicating with shrine officials through theIzokukai (the organization representing families of the war dead).
Another solution which is demanded by leftists (Socialists and Communists) and theKomeito (supported by theSoka Gakkai, a Buddhist group) is to create a separate secular memorial so that the Prime Minister can make official state visits to pay respect to the war dead. Though the proposal is probably the most politically correct one, it is often described as rather farcical. Critics point out that groups representing families of the war dead express no interest in such a memorial, preferring Yasukuni Shrine. Only those who are ideologically committed to demilitarization and the secular constitution of Japan would have any interest in such a site. Furthermore those Socialist, Communist and Komeito members are usually hostile to anything associated withJapanese militarism and are least likely to visit a memorial to pay their respects to the war dead. So the entire demand is farcical and mere political posturing to score ideological points. Critics point out that the proposed site for a secular memorial is deliberately located a great distance from Yasukuni Shrine. The Japanese government conducts yearly secular commemoration services in theBudokan for the families of soldiers killed in World War Two. Afterwards, these families usually make private visits to Yasukuni shrine, which is located only walking distance away from the Budokan. Were the ceremony to be relocated to the proposed memorial site, it would make such visits more difficult. Many see this as a leftist attempt to inconvenience the families and marginalize Yasukuni Shrine.
Lastly, some have suggested that the enshrinement of A class criminals has changed the character of Yasukuni Shrine. A number of families of war dead has indicated that all the controversy is disturbing the peaceful rest of their dead family members and that they wish to pay homage to them without controversy and media attention. Many believe the website and museum maintained by Yasukuni to be political and therefore inappropriate for a religious site and the view propagated by the website and museum to be an embarrassment to Japan‘s prestige in the international community. Some state that Yasukuni should abandon its attachment to State Shintoism and become merely a place where the war dead can rest in peace. For example, the war dead of World War II (Showa Junansha) is translated by the Shrine as "martyrs of Shōwa" when the original Japanese (Junansha) merely means "those who suffered or those who received hardship". Moreover, every kami in Yasukuni is called an "eirei" (hero spirit), which some say glorifies not only the dead but war itself. Still, some argue that A class criminals should not be separated because it would amount to their condemnation, running counter to the theology of Shintoism which does not extend retribution to the dead. Instead, the nature of enshrinement should be changed to "chinkon" (鎮魂), loosely translated as ‘resting or calming of the spirit‘.
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Recent events
The shrine announced that its official website has been under adistributed denial of service (DDoS) attack from a Chinese domain since September2004. Therefore, users may find it difficult to access the website.
In May2005, in the aftermath of anti-Japanese protests over theJapanese history textbooks controversy, Chinese Vice-PremierWu Yi cut short her visit to Japan and flew home before a planned meeting with Japanese Prime MinisterJunichiro Koizumi. This was widely interpreted as a reaction to a statement by Koizumi the day before Wu‘s arrival that foreign countries should not interfere in Japan‘s domestic affairs, including the Yasukuni issue. Wu‘s visit was meant to improve strained relations between the two countries following the textbook controversy, and she had planned to ask Koizumi to stop his visits to the shrine.
In June2005, a senior LDP member proposed moving the 14 Class Awar criminals to a separate site. Shinto priests refused this proposal, quoting Japan‘sfreedom of religion laws under theJapanese Constitution.
Also in the same month, a group ofTaiwanese aborigines led by aboriginal politicianKao-Chin Su-mei attempted to visit Yasukuni Shrine with the help of theJapan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace. They represented nine tribes fromTaiwan whose ancestors are enshrined at Yasukuni and their intention was to peacefully request the removal of their relatives from the shrine, and to pray for the return of their ancestors‘ souls. Request to perform religious rite within the Yasukuni property were refused and they were blocked from entering Yasukuni by Japanese protestors and police. A demonstration was organized by a group of more than one hundred Japanesenationalists to block them from the shrine and prevent them from performing spirit-calling religious rituals within the property the Shrine objected. Japanese police allowed the protestors to remain on the grounds because their entrance to the shrine was not objected by the shrine however they blocked the Taiwanese from leaving their buses, citing measures to prevent clashes between the two groups. After about an hour and a half, the Taiwanese group gave up their attempt. Su-mei and her group reportedly received death threats related to their visit, prompting the Taiwanese government to request Japanese authorities ensure her safety while in Japan.[2]
OnJune 27,2005, the governor of Tokyo,Shintaro Ishihara, toldKyodo News, "If the prime minister does not pay a visit to Yasukuni Shrine this year, I think Japan would go rotten from the inside and collapse."
OnOctober 12,2005, Yasukuni Shrine returned theBukgwan Victory Monument to South Korean authorities. The monument was erected in1707 to commemorate Korean victory over Japanese forces in theSeven-Year War. It was subsequently moved to the shrine by Japan following theRusso-Japanese War of1905 over Korea. South Korea returned it to North Korea in early 2006.
OnOctober 17,2005, Prime MinisterJunichiro Koizumi visited the shrine for the fifth time since taking office. Although Koizumi claimed that his visit was a private affair, officials in thePeople‘s Republic of China responded by canceling a scheduled visit to China byJapanese Foreign MinisterNobutaka Machimura in protest.[3]
OnOctober 28,2005, theLiberal Democratic Party (LDP) and theDemocratic Party of Japan (DPJ) agreed to set up a cross-party "group for pushing forward the establishment of a national memorial facility" to bring about the foundation of a secular war memorial dedicated only to "ordinary" soldiers. This would replace Yasukuni Shrine as the home of Japan‘s war dead. The group is set to meet for the first time onNovember 9,2005.
On15 November2005, Chinese Foreign MinisterLi Zhaoxing stirred controversy during the APEC summit inBusan,South Korea by rhetorically asking: "What would European people think if German leaders were to visit (memorials) related to Hitler and Nazis?"[4]
On16 May2006,Henry Hyde, the Republican chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations sent a letter to Koizumi expressing his "concerns about the efficacy of an invitation to the Japanese prime minister who continues to make controversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine."[5]. Hyde‘s letter underscored the offensive nature a shrine visit was to Americans who remember World War Two and Hyde didn‘t want to "dishonor the site in Congress where President Franklin D. Roosevelt made his "day of infamy" speech after the December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor."[6].
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Further reading
Breen, John. "The dead and the living in the land of peace: a sociology of the Yasukuni shrine". Mortality 9, 1 (February 2004): 76-93. Nelson, John. "Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spirits of the Military Dead at Yasukuni Shinto Shrine". Journal of Asian Studies 62, 2 (May 2003): 445-467.
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The controversy
Ijiri, Hidenori. "Sino-Japanese Controversies since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization". China Quarterly 124 (Dec 1990): 639-661. Shibuichi, Daiki. "The Yasukuni Dispute and the Politics of Identity of Japan: Why All the Fuss?" Asian Survey 45, 2 (March-April 2005): 197-215. Tamamoto, Masaru. "A Land Without Patriots: The Yasukuni Controversy and Japanese Nationalism". World Policy Journal 18, 3 (Fall 2001): 33-40. Yang, Daqing. “Mirror for the future of the history card? Understanding the ‘history problem’” in Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Complementarity and Conflict, edited by Marie Söderberg, 10-31. New York, NY: Routledge, 2002.
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See also
ShintoJinja (shrine)List of Shinto shrinesJapanese nationalismJapanese war crimesAnti-Japanese sentimentChinese nationalism
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References
 
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External links
Yasukuni Shrine official website (English)Yūshūkan museum official website (English)A feature from The Japan Times on the chief priest of Yasukuni and his views of PM visitsPictures from Yasukuni ShrineJapan‘s Memory Lapses article byMax BootDetailed unofficial website about the Yūshūkan museumYasukuni Jinja photos and slideshow on the 60th anniversary of Japan‘s surrender (2005)Yasukuni Jinja Yūshūkan
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