金正日与他的儿子们--【外交事务 一家之言】

The Once and Future Kim

金正日跟他的儿子们

By Jennifer Lind

珍妮弗. 林德

October 25, 2010

2010年10月25日

Summary: North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has anointed his third son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor. Kim Jong Un will have many obstacles to overcome. But powerful forces will encourage stability, and the continued, sorry reign of the Kim family.

概要：朝鲜领导人金正日已经正式任命他的小儿子--金正恩为朝鲜政权接班人。摆在金正恩前面的，是层峦叠嶂的困难需要他去克服。但来自各方强大的势力会巩固朝鲜国家的稳定，支持这个金氏家族“可怜”的统治。

JENNIFER LIND is Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, and the author of Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics.

珍妮弗. 林德是来自美国达特茅斯学院的政府系教授，著有《国家道歉：国际政治的道歉行为》一书。

At the historic Workers’ Party meeting that took place in Pyongyang last September, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il anointed his third son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor. The decision recalled the words of King Lear, who, announcing his retirement, said he wanted “to shake all cares and business from our age / Conferring them on younger strengths, while we / Unburden'd crawl toward death.” Today, the world watches, hoping that compared to Lear, Kim’s judgment will be more sensible, his relatives less venal, and his eventual succession less bloody. Succession is always a regime’s most difficult challenge, and Kim Jong Un will have many obstacles to overcome when he tries to take power. But powerful forces will encourage stability and the continued, sorry reign of the Kim family.

At first blush, the road ahead for the “Brilliant Comrade,” as Kim Jong Un is called, does not look smooth. Said to be around 27 years old, he is young and inexperienced. He has two older brothers and an untold number of relatives who may be eyeing the crown. Outsiders do not know how news of his ascension was greeted by the elites who prop up the Kim regime -- whether they share the views of eldest brother Kim Jong Nam, who told an interviewer, “Personally, I am opposed to the hereditary transfer to a third generation of the family.” Perhaps most important, one wonders how the military feels about such a youthful figure suddenly being promoted to four-star general and handed the reins of power.

去年9月份在首都平壤召开的具有历史性意义的朝鲜劳动党会议上，金正日正式选定他的小儿子-金正恩为朝鲜政权下一届接班人。这一决定不由地让人回想起莎士比亚戏剧中李尔王退位时说的“我这个年纪的人，很想摆脱所有的烦恼，卸下重任交给这些新生力量，这样我们也好安心的上路”。整个世界都在关注这一权力交接，希望金正日比当初李尔王退位时做出的决定更明智，希望那些与金正日有血缘关系的人中少一些腐败分子，希望权力最后的交接不会那样血腥。对于一个政权来说，权力的继承永远是最大的一个挑战。金正恩若想掌权，必须要清除前面许许多多的障碍。但来自各方强大的势力会巩固朝鲜国家的稳定，支持这个金氏家族“可怜”的统治。

从表面上看，对于已被称为“伟大同志”的金正恩，前面的路并不平坦。今年还不到27岁的他，年轻，没有多少从政经验。他有两个哥哥，还有一大堆也许仍在觊觎“政权”的亲戚。对于金正恩的擢升，那些“开国元老”们到底是支持，还是像金正日的大儿子金正男那样明确反对，外界不得而知。作为哥哥，金正男曾在一次采访中曾明确表示：“就我个人而言，我反对将权力世袭给我们家的第三代。”或许，最为重要的是---军队，对于这个初出茅庐的小伙子突然晋升为四星上将并号令三军，到底持什么态度。

Aside from his internal challenges, Kim Jong Un will inherit a wreck of a country. Energy shortages continue to ravage North Korea’s already frail economy. The 1995–97 famine killed more than one million North Koreans and created an undernourished generation wracked by cognitive disabilities. A 2008 U.S. National Intelligence Council study on global health reported that half of North Korean children are stunted or underweight, while fully two-thirds of young adults are malnourished or anemic.

除了家庭内部问题外，金正恩要接手的是个“烂摊子”的国家。各种资源的短缺仍在折磨着朝鲜已经非常脆弱的经济。在1995年到1997年间，有超过一百万人死于饥荒，一大批同处那个时代的人因营养不良而患上一些“认知类”残疾。一份来自美国国家情报局关于2008年度全球各国人们健康状况的研究表明：一半的朝鲜儿童发育受阻或体重偏低，足有三分之二的青壮年患有营养不良或贫血等症状。

To make matters worse, North Korea is encircled by powerful adversaries. To the east is Japan, a military and economic powerhouse that annexed and colonized Korea in the early twentieth century. Below lies South Korea, which has 20 times the GDP of North Korea, twice its population, and a military alliance with the global hegemon. South Korea’s military is far more technologically advanced than North Korea’s and is staffed with well-trained and well-fed soldiers. Across North Korea’s northern border is China, an erstwhile ally that regards Pyongyang with a warmth that ranges from jaw-clenched resignation to total exasperation.

朝鲜四周“强敌环顾”，让本来不太好的国外形势雪上加霜。在它东面有日本--日本历来为军事及经济强国，20世纪初曾强占朝鲜半岛并进行殖民统治；南面有韩国--韩国GDP总量相当于朝鲜的20倍，人口总数达到朝鲜的两倍，并且背后有强大盟国的支持。与朝鲜相比，韩国武器精良，士兵暖衣饱食，训练有素；北方是曾为昔日盟友的中国--中国对朝鲜一直保持着一种热情，不管是朝鲜坚决反对某事时还是举双手赞成时。

However daunting all of this may seem, and however dim Kim Jong Un’s prospects appear, several factors, both internal and external, will work in his favor. He will rely on the system designed by his grandfather, the founder of North Korea, Kim Il Sung -- a system that, as Daniel Byman and I have written, was designed for resilience.

虽然这些情况看上去非常令人沮丧，虽然金正恩的前途看上去非常黯淡，有几点因素，包括家族内和家族外的，对他十分有利。金正恩的爷爷--朝鲜第一位国家领导人金日成执政时推行的宪法将使金正恩的江山。这部宪法，正如我和丹尼尔. 拜曼所写过的，是专门为防止权力的旁落而制定的。

Kim Il Sung devised this system to deter revolution from below and military coups from within. An elaborate ideology confers legitimacy upon the Kim family: according to the country’s founding myth, Kim Il Sung led a gallant band of guerilla fighters in the bitter winds of Manchuria to defeat the Japanese, liberate the Korean people, and establish the North Korean state. As historians such as Charles Armstrong and Bruce Cumings have argued, this genesis tale secures Kim Il Sung as the father, son, and holy spirit of the “religion” that is North Korea. Like his father, Kim Jong Un enjoys the legitimacy of Kim Il Sung’s blood in his veins -- and even bears a striking resemblance to his broad-cheeked grandfather. Kim Jong Un has allies who share his formidable pedigree. His aunt, Kim Kyong Hui (recently elevated to four-star general), is Kim Il Sung’s daughter; her husband, Jang Song Taek, is, as the vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, Kim Jong Il’s number two. Kim Jong Un and these allies enjoy a great deal of legitimacy from this “great leader” (suryong) system.

金日成修改的这部宪法，有力的抑制了下层群众革命以及军队内部发生兵变的可能性。这部精心制作的思想体系赋予金氏家族其政权统治的合法性：根据朝鲜的开国史话记载，伟大领袖金日成带领一批英勇的游击队员，面对日伪满洲国残酷的镇压，赶走了日本侵略者，解放了朝鲜人民，并建立朝鲜人民民主共和国。正如历史学家查尔斯. 阿姆斯特朗和布鲁斯. 卡明斯认为的那样，这个故事让金日成在朝鲜这个国度成了圣父、圣子、圣灵--三位一体的“神”。和他的父亲金正日一样，金正恩的身上流淌着金日成的血，他那宽大的脸颊跟他爷爷也极为相似。金正恩身边的支持者同样家事显赫：他的姑姑，金敬姬（最近被擢升为四星上将）是金日成的女儿；而她丈夫，张成泽，是朝鲜国防委员会副主席，金正日集团的二号人物。显然这个“伟大领袖的光荣家庭”的优秀背景让金正恩及其支持者的统治地位名正言顺。

Xenophobia is another ideological tool that helps prevent revolution. The regime’s propaganda inspires fear of dire threats from predatory Japanese and perfidious Americans, who are aided by traitorous South Koreans. These supposed dangers justify the powerful political role of the military, which already enjoys a glow of legitimacy provided by the Manchurian tale. By keeping North Korea on a perpetual war footing, the regime justifies spending a massive share of its budget on the military (25 percent of GDP, compared to South Korea’s four percent) -- a great deal of which goes to internal security.

除了修改宪法，“敌视一切外国势力”是另外一种当局用来防止内部革命的思想工具。他们利用媒体大肆进行宣传，让人们普遍认同日本侵略者的烧杀抢掠，以及美帝国主义的背信弃义--这些作为“叛徒”--南朝鲜的友军给朝鲜带来的巨大威胁。这些假想的威胁论极大的巩固了军队的政治地位，这些军队一直以来都头顶着“伪满洲国人民救星”的光环。为了保证朝鲜时刻处于备战状态，朝鲜当局每年的军费开支预算竟高达GDP的25%，而韩国的军费开支仅为其GDP的4%。这种对国防安全的投入是相当大的。

The risk of popular rebellion is also reduced by Kim Il Sung’s social engineering. In the communist system that Kim Il Sung created, North Korea has neither a middle class nor a clergy -- groups that are frequently instrumental in fomenting revolution. Students and intellectuals -- other would-be revolutionaries -- have been intellectually defanged by the regime’s strict control of information. Heavily monitored, they are deterred from dissent by the threat of terrible punishment.

早期金日成进行的社会性改造措施也让朝鲜发生内部叛乱的风险性大大降低。在这个“共产主义”社会里，是没有中间阶层或是教士阶层的--通常这两个阶层是社会中非常容易引起社会变动的社会力量。学生以及知识分子以及那些立志成为革命分子的人，在朝鲜当局严密的舆论控制下，他们从精神上已经没有任何攻击性。加上无处不在的监控，他们因为害怕受到残酷的惩罚而不敢轻举妄动。

Indeed, perhaps the most important factor deterring revolution in North Korea is the government’s threat or use of force. Informants from multiple security agencies watch for any stirrings of dissent. People who commit relatively minor transgressions -- failing to dust their Kim family portraits, for example -- undergo “reeducation”: extra self-criticism sessions or more time forced to memorize the writings of the Great Leader. People who are accused of more serious disloyalty are exiled to harsh lives in the remote countryside, sent to brutal prison camps, or executed. North Korea’s would-be freedom fighters know that, according to the government’s “three generations” policy, they risk the arrest, incarceration, torture, and death not only of themselves but also of their parents and children. For all of these reasons, during the famine “North Korea’s starving farmers did not rebel,” Andrei Lankov noted. “They just died.”

实际上，在朝鲜，最有效的制止国内革命的手段就是来自政府的威胁或迫害。来自不同情报部门的工作人员日复一日盯着“下面”的风吹草动。人们稍有“越轨”行为，如没有打扫家里的领袖相框，就得面对进行“再教育”---开展自我批评或者被迫花更多时间背诵领袖文选。如果犯罪情节严重，就会被下放到边远山村里接受残酷的劳动改造，最高可被执行死刑。那些原本能“为自由而战”的人们很清楚，根据政府的“连坐”政策，他们不但是在拿自己被拘捕、被关押、被折磨、被处死来冒险，同时冒险的还有他们的父母和孩子。正因为如此，在大饥荒期间，那些饿的要命的农民也没有发生任何暴动。就像Andrei Lankov 说的“他们就那么忍着死去”。

Although the military is a dictator’s most important ally, it may also be his ultimate undoing. But the odds of a military coup in North Korea have been significantly reduced by Kim Il Sung’s measures to “coup-proof” his government. From the inception of the regime in the 1950s, Kim selected political and military leaders on the basis of political loyalty rather than professional competence, installing his relatives and guerilla cronies in the most powerful positions. To maximize the intelligence he received about any brewing disloyalty, he designed multiple internal security agencies that competed with and watched one another, and all reported to him. In the event that these measures failed and a coup occurred, Kim Il Sung created a parallel military force to protect himself from the Korean People’s Army.

对于独裁者来说，军队是他最重要的依靠，但也可能是最终葬送自己的祸根。但金日成费尽心思采取措施让他的政府变成“与政变绝缘”的政府，在朝鲜发生军事政变的可能性已经很小。自20世纪50年代刚刚建立政权起，金日成选择政治军事将领的原则就定位于他们的政治忠诚度，而不是他们的工作能力。他将他的家属以及游击队时的死党安插在重要的岗位上。为了更全面的了解所有能够滋生“不忠”的地方，金日成设置了许多内部情报部门，并让他们互相监视，然后统一向他报告。即便这些措施全部失效，朝鲜发生军事政变，金日成创立的另外一只与之平行的武装力量也足以能够与朝鲜人民军对立抗衡。

Another factor reducing the likelihood of military coups is North Korea’s class system, which is divided into three tiers. The “core” class consists of favored elites who have impeccable pro-regime credentials (such as relatives who were wounded while fighting for the North in the Korean War). A “wavering” class has more questionable bloodlines. Consigned to the “hostile” class are people whose relatives fought for the South in the war or supported the Japanese occupation of the peninsula.

另外一个限制朝鲜军事政变可能性的因素是朝鲜的社会阶层体制，共分为三个不同阶层。第一是“核心”阶层，由那些“根正苗红”的特权精英们构成，比如在朝鲜战争中伤员家属；第二是“动摇”阶层，他们往往有不确定的血统。第三是“敌对”阶层，这部分人主要由朝鲜战争中亲韩以及亲日人员的家属构成。

Elites in the core class are co-opted with comfortable jobs, housing, and gifts (such as cognac, flat-screen televisions, and Mercedes-Benzes). They are also allowed to live in Pyongyang, which, during the famine, meant the difference between life and death. Since the regime gave more food to residents of the capital than it did to the wavering or hostile classes exiled to the hinterland, it thus targeted the famine on its opponents while sheltering its allies. Because of this class system and regime co-optation, any disgruntled member of the North Korean military elite knows that a failed coup attempt would result in his own execution and would forever relegate his family to the hostile class. As hostiles, family members would forfeit their good jobs and good schools, their plentiful food and luxury cars, in exchange for penury and -- in the likely event of more food shortages -- starvation.

处于“核心”阶层的特权精英们享有舒适的工作、房子和各种奢侈品（如白兰地、平板电视还有梅赛德斯-奔驰）。他们有权住在首都平壤，在饥荒年代，这将决定他们的生死。由于当局给首都人民提供的食物比那些被下放农村的“动摇”阶层以及“敌对”阶层得到的要多的多，饥荒来临时，支持政权就有饭吃，反之就要被饿死。就是因为这种阶层划分和怀柔政策，军事精英们即便心有不服，他们心里也很明白，如果发动政变失败，那么不但自己会被处死，整个家族也会永远被扣上“敌对”阶层的帽子。当上了“敌对”阶级，可想而知，舒适的工作和良好的教育，丰富的食物以及昂贵的车子就会随之而去，从此生活重新进入拮据，甚至在食物紧缺的情况被活活饿死。

“A prince,” Niccolo Machiavelli wrote, “should have two fears: one, internal concerning his subjects; the other, external, concerning foreign powers.” As a weak country surrounded by powerful neighbors, North Korea’s external position looks dire. But as insecure as the country appears, Kim Jong Un will not face serious external pressure. In 1993, after Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States contemplated cruise missile attacks on North Korean nuclear facilities but demurred for fear of war on the peninsula. Since then, two North Korean nuclear tests have provided an added deterrent.

意大利历史学家尼可罗·马基亚维利曾在《君主论》中写道“身为君主，应当注意两件事：对内，关乎臣民；对外，关乎列强。”身处强邻围绕之中，朝鲜的国外形势似乎岌岌可危。但与表象上的那种不安全相反，金正恩面对的国外压力并不会很大。1993年，当朝鲜单方面宣布退出《不扩散核武器条约》，美国曾计划发射巡航导弹摧毁朝鲜核设施但忌于可能由此引发的朝鲜半岛战争而犹豫不决。自那时起，朝鲜又进行了两次核试验，为自己增加了威慑敌国的砝码。

But today, North Korea’s greatest deterrent lies not in its power but in its weakness. The grim specter of the potential chaos associated with the collapse of the Kim regime in the event of war has led neighboring countries to treat it with kid gloves. Outside countries fear that the government’s collapse could unleash a civil war; send refugees streaming into China, South Korea, and across the sea to Japan; and let “loose nukes” from North Korea’s arsenal find their way onto the global black market. An already dangerous situation could grow far deadlier if -- in order to stem refugee flows, track down weapons of mass destruction, or help starving North Koreans -- China, South Korea, or the United States decided to unilaterally intervene and found their forces jostling together on the small peninsula.

但是现在，朝鲜最大的威胁不是它有多么“强”，而是它会有多么“弱”。一想到发生战争就有可能出现金氏政权垮台，然后政治秩序混乱的可怕局面，这些邻邦国家便投鼠忌器，只能谨小慎微的处理与朝鲜的关系。而外界国家则担心一旦政府垮台，朝鲜就会爆发内战，大批的难民就会潮水般涌向中国，韩国，甚至漂洋过海，涌向日本；那些“自由”了的核武器就会自动进入全球黑市自由买卖。更重要的是，本来已经很严峻的政治形势将会变得更加“致命”---美、中、韩三国或是为阻止难民流向本国，或者为追踪大规模杀伤性武器的下落，或是为了救济朝鲜难民，将单方面对朝鲜半岛事务进行干涉，各国势力介入必然矛盾重重，引发新的危机。

As a result of these fears, when confronted with the latest North Korean outrage, countries have chosen to keep their swords sheathed. South Korea and others have sought to engage North Korea and have provided it with large amounts of aid, restricting retaliation to strongly worded condemnations and economic sanctions. Last March, such dovishness even dominated in response to a North Korean act of war: the sinking of the Cheonan and murder of 46 South Korean sailors.

正是因为有这些担忧，最近发生的与朝鲜方面的摩擦，各国都保持了克制。韩国和其他国家都试图寻找方法与朝鲜和谐共处，向朝鲜提供大量的物质援助，并把报复打击军事行为控制在语言上的强烈抗议以及经济上的制裁。三月份发生的“天安号”事件，虽然造成46位韩国海军士兵阵亡，但各方总体对于朝鲜的这种战争行为保持了克制。

Such docility is unusual given the level of provocation. In the 1990s, Saddam Hussein routinely harassed U.S. aircraft in the no-fly zones by switching on Iraqi air defense radars. The U.S. military often responded by destroying those radars or other military targets. Kim Jong Il’s sinking of the Cheonan was a far more belligerent act, yet there was no military retaliation. Any use of force -- a tit-for-tat attack on North Korea’s submarine pens, perhaps -- was rejected as too dangerous, too prone to start a war, and too likely to hand South Korea a bedraggled mess of a country. Thus, for a country as insecure as North Korea, Kim Jong Un will find himself in a bizarrely secure position: for all that people despise the Kim regime, no one wants it to collapse.

对于这种水平的挑衅行为置之不理显然是很不正常的。20世纪90年代，当萨达姆的部队经常启动伊拉克防空雷达对禁飞区内的美国空军进行电子干扰时，美国人回应的方式就是炸毁那些雷达以及其他军事设施。朝鲜军队击沉天安舰，情节比伊拉克对美军的电子干扰行为要严重的多，但却没有任何来自韩国的军事打击报复。可能的猜测是，任何针对朝鲜潜艇针锋相对的军事打击计划，都会被认为太危险、容易引发两国开战，把韩国拖入战争的泥淖中而被否决。因此，对于这样一个“不安全”的国家，金正恩会发觉他反而会非常的安全：因为所有国家都瞧不起这个政权，没人希望它就这么垮掉。

To be sure, Kim Jong Il (or, eventually, Kim Jong Un) could push Seoul too far. South Korean officials have recently shown a much greater willingness to discuss unification, a topic that was anathema only a few years ago. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has proposed a unification tax to set aside funds for the staggering financial burden of unification; Seoul has increased contingency planning and sketched out blueprints for administering North Korean cities. A few more Cheonan-like incidents, and South Korea’s fuming conservatives may decide that the Kim regime is simply too reckless to be allowed to stay in power.

显然，金正日（最终或者是金正恩）迟早会惹恼韩国。最近一些韩国的高级政府官员对统一半岛大业热情极高，要知道这在几年前，还是一个众人避而嫌之的话题。韩国总统李明博建议开设统一税，为将来必不平坦的统一事业积蓄资金。韩国不但已经做好应对各种突发事件的准备，而且甚至为将来有效管理朝鲜的城市发展勾画好了蓝图。如果再有几个类似“天安号”的事件，韩国那些按捺不住的保守派也会认为不宜再迁就金氏政权继续存活。

But meanwhile, despite all of the obstacles Kim Jong Un must overcome as he ascends the throne, powerful forces will encourage stability. Because of the regime’s many tools of authoritarian control, revolutions or military coups will likely be deterred, detected, or quashed. Because of the dread of collapse, North Korea’s neighbors will likely continue, at least to a certain point, to allow the regime to run its pathetic kingdom. The alternative is too dangerous.

与此同时，尽管金正恩在“登基”的道路上必须克服这些所有的困难，强大的军队会促进国内的稳定。不管是国内革命还是军事政变，在当局变化莫测的专制机构统治监控下，都有可能被阻止、觉察或被镇压。另外，如前文所说，由于担忧金氏政权垮台带来的恶劣后果，朝鲜各帮邻国家至少在相当一段时间内继续让金氏政权继续管理这个“可怜”的国度。因为一旦让其垮台，后果是非常严重的。

添加新评论

相关文章：

金正银 出席朝鲜战争纪念大会

美国，请放手朝鲜

6大残暴领导人的私密癖好

下一代金氏王朝：朝鲜偶像运动开始神化下一代领导人

朝鲜在国庆日首次开放互联网